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ARTICLE
The Honorable John G. Browning
Judged by the (Digital) Company You Keep:
Maintaining Judicial Ethics in an Age of Likes,
Shares, and Follows
Abstract. Just like lawyers, judicial use of social media can present ethical
pitfalls. And while most scholarly attention has focused on either active social
media conduct by judges (such as posting or tweeting) or on social media
“friendships” between judges and others, this Article analyses the ethical
dimensions of seemingly benign judicial conduct on social media platforms,
such as following a third party or “liking,” sharing, or retweeting the online
posts of others. Using real-world examples, this Article analyses how even such
ostensibly benign conduct can create the appearance of impropriety and
undermine public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Author. Justice John G. Browning is a partner in the Plano, Texas office of
Spencer Fane LLP, a former justice on Texas’ Fifth District Court of Appeals,
and Visiting Associate Professor at Faulkner University’s Thomas Goode Jones
School of Law. His scholarship focuses on the intersection of technology and
the law, and particularly on the impact of technology on legal ethics. He also
serves as Chair of the Institute for Law and Technology at the Center for
American and International Law. Justice Browning received his Bachelor
degrees with honors from Rutgers University, and his J.D. from the University
of Texas School of Law. He is the author of five law books and more than
forty law review articles.
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“It is not only what we do, but also what we do not do,
for which we are accountable.” 1
—Molière
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers and judges, like the rest of society, live and work in an
increasingly wired world in which the use of social media platforms has
become ubiquitous. More than 72% of adult Americans use social media to
connect with one another, engage with news content, share information,
and entertain themselves.2 Facebook remains the most popular platform
with over 2.3 billion users worldwide, but sites like Instagram, Snapchat,
Twitter, YouTube, and LinkedIn are also hugely popular.3 The amount of
content generated or shared on social media platforms is staggering: Twitter,
which boasts 192 million daily active users, processes more than one billion
tweets every forty-eight hours.4 In 2020, there were 7,000 tweets each
minute—just about TV or movies.5
Judges are hardly immune to the siren song of social media use, and in
many ways that’s a positive thing. As the author and other commentators
have pointed out, social media platforms can be a vital political tool for
those judges who must run in partisan elections, a useful means of
engagement with the communities they serve, and an important asset in
educating the public about the judiciary’s role and fostering confidence in
the integrity of the judiciary.6 However, judges are human, too, and just as
1. Tryon Edwards, DD, Sin, in, A DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS: A CYCLOPEDIA OF LACONIC
QUOTATIONS, FROM THE BEST AUTHORS OF THE WORLD, BOTH MODERN AND ANCIENT 527, 528
(attributed to Molière) (Detroit, F.B. Dickerson, 1908).
2. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/
internet/fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/6KTW-6EMV].
3. Id.
4. Ying Lin, 10 Twitter Statistics Every Marketer Should Know in 2021, OBERLO (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://www.oberlo.com/blog/twitter-statistics [https://perma.cc/GUF2-WWND].
5. Christina Newberry, 36 Twitter Stats All Marketers Need to Know in 2021, HOOTSUITE
(Feb. 3, 2021), https://blog.hootsuite.com/twitter-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/575Q-L53X].
6. See Stephen Louis A. Dillard & Bridget Mary McCormack, The Robed Tweeter: Two Judges’ Views
on Public Engagement, 20 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 179, 180 (2019) (“[O]ne of the best ways for judges
to effectively engage the people they serve is to embrace the ubiquitous social-media platforms other
citizens use to communicate and interact with one another.”); John G. Browning, The Judge as Digital
Citizen: Pros, Cons, and Ethical Limitations on Judicial Use of New Media, 8 FAULKNER L. REV. 131, 131–32
(2016) (“One reason for the increased use of social media by judges may be the growing importance
of these platforms in political races. With thirty-nine states using some form of election to select their
trial judges, and thirty-nine states using some form of election to select their appellate court judges, use
of social networking platforms as a political tool in the United States has become necessary to
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social media is often a lens into the less desirable personality traits of people
from other walks of life, judges’ social media use has sometimes veered off
into the inappropriate and inflammatory. In July 2021, NBC News even did
a report on the rash of reports of judicial misconduct on social media.7
Given the polarized political climate that has characterized the United States
in recent years, it is hardly surprising that some judges have succumbed to
the temptation to venture onto social media to weigh in on political issues
and controversies. For example, in the spring 2021 issue of the Judicial
Conduct Reporter, Cynthia Gray of the National Center for State Courts
contributed an article devoted to “Social Media Posts by Judges on
Controversial Issues.”8 In it, she describes a number of recent instances of
judges who have been disciplined for social media posts about political or
controversial issues.9 Among this robed “rogues gallery” are examples like
Tennessee criminal court Judge Jim Lammey, who received a public
reprimand for making partisan Facebook posts on a wide range of political
or politically-charged issues.10 These included sharing posts critical of thenpresidential candidate Hillary Clinton, undocumented immigrants, the Black
Lives Matter movement, and transgender bathrooms.11 Another was late
Utah justice court Judge Michael Kwan, who received a six month
suspension from the Utah Supreme Court in 2019 for Facebook posts
critical of then-candidate Donald Trump, as well as one shortly after
President Trump’s inauguration that said, “Welcome to the beginning of the
fascist takeover.”12
professional survival.” (footnote omitted)); John G. Browning & Don Willett, Rules of Engagement:
Exploring Judicial Use of Social Media, 79 TEX. B.J. 100, 101 (2016) (“With judges elected in 39 states
(including Texas), social media is a fruitful way to engage with the community as well as an individual
means of raising visibility, building awareness, and leveraging the support of key influencers and
opinion leaders.”).
7. Erik Ortiz, Reprimand of Judges for Social Media Misconduct Warrants Updated Guidelines, Experts
Say, NBC NEWS (July 8, 2021, 3:32 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/reprimandjudges-social-media-misconduct-warrants-updated-guidelines-experts-say-n1273179 [https://perma.
cc/J6BQ-WWZF].
8. Cynthia Gray, Social Media Posts by Judges on Controversial Issues, 43 JUD. CONDUCT RPT. 2
(2021).
9. See generally id. (describing multiple instances of judicial misconduct on social media).
10. Daniel Connolly, Board Clears Judge Lammey of Anti-Immigration Complaints, Reprimands Him for
Partisanship, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL (Nov. 18, 2019, 4:51 PM), https://www.commercialappeal.
com/story/news/crime/2019/11/18/memphis-judge-lammey-gets-split-decision-partisan-remarksruling/4232190002/ [https://perma.cc/M32X-T98Q].
11. Id.
12. Mary Hanbury, ‘Welcome to the Beginning of the Fascist Takeover’: A Utah Judge Was Suspended
Without Pay for Making Anti-Trump Comments Online and in Court, BUS. INSIDER (May 26, 2019,
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However, social media can be an ethical minefield for judges—not just
for actively posting or tweeting inappropriately, but also for more seemingly
benign conduct such as liking or sharing the posts or tweets of another or
even following a party or counsel on social media. Previous examinations
of the ethical risks associated with judicial use of social media have focused
on either jurists’ active participation on social media (posting, tweeting, etc.)
or on the ethical boundaries of social media relationships (such as a judge’s
Facebook “friendships”).13 As this Article will demonstrate, however,
because of the critical importance of avoiding even the appearance of
impropriety, judges who wish to avoid recusal and potential disciplinary
exposure must carefully consider not just what they themselves post or
tweet. They must also be mindful of how they react to the tweets and posts
of others, as well as those they follow on social media.
II. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVITY OF OTHERS—
AN EVOLVING AREA
A. Liability for the Online Comments of Third Parties
Generally speaking, the Anglo-American legal tradition has been sparing
when it comes to imposing civil liability on a party for the conduct of
another actor beyond that party’s control, or right to control. Obviously,
there are situations arising out of a contractual (indemnity) or employment
relationship (witness the doctrine of respondeat superior) in which such
responsibility is well-recognized.14 For the most part imposing civil liability
for the wrongs of another is disfavored. However, when it comes to
conduct on social media, cracks have begun to appear in this façade. In
several recent cases in the United States and Australia, parties have been
held accountable for the social media postings of third parties.
In December 2019, the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered a
criminal contempt case, In the Matter of Eldridge.15 On November 29, 2018,
10:25 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/utah-judge-suspended-over-anti-trump-commentsmichael-kwan-2019-5 [https://perma.cc/F8DV-62VN].
13. See John G. Browning, Why Can’t We Be Friends? Judges’ Use of Social Media, 68 MIAMI L. REV.
487, 510 (2014) (discussing incidents of judicial conduct, ethics, and social media use); Agnieszka
McPeak, The Internet Made Me Do It: Reconciling Social Media and Professional Norms for Lawyers, Judges, and
Law Professors, 55 IDAHO L. REV. 205, 216–19 (2019) (defining professional norms on social media for
lawyers, judges, and law professors).
14. Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 846 (Tex. 2018).
15. In the Matter of Eldridge, 836 S.E.2d 859 (N.C. 2019).
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Davin Eldridge—a “citizen journalist” who published a Facebook page
called “Trappalachia,” went to the Macon County Courthouse.16 Despite
posted signs banning the use of cell phones, cameras, or any other recording
devices, Eldridge proceeded to livestream a criminal court hearing until he
was caught.17 At a show cause hearing on why he shouldn’t be held in
contempt, Eldridge was found guilty, given a suspended jail sentence of
thirty days, and placed on probation with several conditions.18 One of the
conditions was to write a 2,000–3,000 word essay about respect for the court
system, and following approval by the court, to post it on “all social media
or internet accounts that defendant owns or controls . . . without negative
comment or other criticism by the defendant or others.”19
The court of appeals upheld the trial judge’s order, but one justice
dissented in part over the court-imposed obligation to monitor and delete
the negative comments that might be made by third parties.20 Judge Brook
felt that obligating the defendant to engage in “censoring the viewpoints of
others expressed in response to speech compelled by the court . . . raise[d]
serious First Amendment concerns.”21 As Brook put it, “[i]t holds
Defendant responsible for what is essentially the behavior of others; and
while there is some truth to the adage that we are only as good as the
company we keep, the relevant community in this context is incredibly
diffuse, extending through cyberspace.”22 Yet despite the “deeply troubling
constitutional problems with this condition of probation” raised by
Judge Brook, on March 12, 2021, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
affirmed the lower court.23
North Carolina is not a lone outlier. In December 2019, the Houston
[First District] Court of Appeals upheld a similar court order requiring a
party to delete the comments of others on a Facebook post.24 In Thang Bui
v. Maya Dangelas,25 an online defamation case brought under the Texas
16. Id. at 860.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 861.
19. Id. at 863 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 864 (Brook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21. Id. at 865–66.
22. Id. at 865.
23. Id.; In re Eldridge, 854 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 2021) (per curiam).
24. Thang Bui v. Maya Dangelas, No. 01-18-00790-CV, 2019 WL 7341671, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2019), pet. denied) (mem.).
25. Thang Bui v. Maya Dangelas, No. 01-18-00790-CV, 2019 WL 7341671 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2019), pet. denied) (mem.).
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Citizens Participation Act, a Harris County trial court ordered Bui and
Nguyen to delete threatening comments by third parties on Facebook.26
Bui and Nguyen’s Facebook posts had been found to be defamatory
(allegedly accusing Dangelas of being a Viet Cong operative who funneled
communist money into the United States), and comments made by third
parties in response to the posts made the plaintiff fear for her physical
safety.27
Bui and Nguyen maintained that their own posts were not threatening
and argued that they should not be compelled to police and delete the
comments of others made in response to their posts.28 The First District
Court of Appeals rejected that argument, determining that Facebook made
such deletion possible by an account holder and pointing to the absence of
any “legal authority regarding how the First Amendment protects against
deletion of someone else’s threatening posts made in reply to one’s own
post.”29 On May 8, 2020, the Supreme Court of Texas denied Bui and
Nguyen’s petition for review, allowing the troubling ruling to stand.30
Should individuals be considered their “brother’s digital keeper?” May
someone be compelled to censor anyone in cyberspace who might comment
on their Facebook post or tweet? If a sympathetic relative, friend, or
business associate posts a comment that disparages or even threatens a
party’s adversary, can that party be held responsible? Under the reasoning
of the Eldridge and Thang Bui courts, new legal duties might be imposed,
including duties to monitor and delete the comments of others. This very
notion of imposing a duty to oversee the First Amendment-protected
speech of third parties is concerning.
American courts are not alone in sanctioning a “digital gatekeeper” role.
On September 8, 2021, the High Court of Australia issued a troubling
opinion in yet another online defamation case, Fairfax Media v. Voller.31 The
defendants/appellants were various media entities that regularly posted links
to their stories on their respective Facebook accounts.32 As with other
Facebook posts, readers routinely commented on the posts, and apparently
in the eyes of plaintiffs/respondents, certain reader comments were
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *4.
Id. (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i)).
The Supreme Court of Texas, Order Denying Petition for Review (May 8, 2020).
Fairfax Media Pubs. Pty. Ltd. v. Voller [2021] HCA 27 (Austl.).
Id. at ¶ 1.
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defamatory.33 While Australia does not have a counterpart to the United
States’ Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act,34 immunity for
social media platforms from such civil allegations, it does recognize a
defense of “innocent dissemination.”35 However, under Australian
defamation law, a plaintiff need only establish publication in order to satisfy
a prima facie case.36 A plaintiff does not have the burden to also establish
culpable dissemination.37 In this case, both the lower court (the Supreme
Court of New South Wales) and the High Court believed that the Facebook
account holders (the media entities) “published” the readers’ allegedly
defamatory comments.38 Consequently, in a 5–2 decision that included
four opinions spanning over seventy pages, the High Court legally equated
ordinary social media account holders with traditional media publishers and
broadcasters, holding that Facebook users could be strictly liable for all
defamatory comments to their posts.39 Ruling that each appellant “became
a publisher of each comment posted on its public Facebook page by a
Facebook user as and when that comment was accessed in a comprehensible
form by another Facebook user,” the plurality opinion opens the door to a
duty by social media users to actively police the comments of third parties.40
In dissent, a skeptical Justice Steward opined: “[T]he mere act of posting by
a Facebook page administrator is unlikely to justify, in and of itself, the
factual conclusion that the administrator has thereby participated in the
publication of all subsequent responses. More is needed to be a
publisher.”41 As a result of the High Court’s decision, Justice Steward
warned:
All Facebook page owners whether public or private, would be publishers of
third-party comments posted on their Facebook pages, even those which were
unwanted, unsolicited, and entirely unpredicted. Indeed, it might extend to
cases where a Facebook page is hacked and then has posted on it entirely

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
See generally 47 U.S.C. § 230 (providing protections for online speech).
Id. at ¶ 11.
Id. at ¶¶ 10, 13.
Id. at ¶ 18.
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 98.
Id. at ¶ 173 (Steward, J., dissenting).
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unwelcome, uninvited and vile defamatory comments, whether by the hacker
or in response to a post made by the hacker.42

B. Lawyers’ and Judges’ Responsibility for the Social Media Conduct of Others
While the concept of bearing some measure of blame or responsibility
for the social media conduct of others may seem jarring to the average
person, it is not a particularly foreign concept for lawyers and judges. After
all, American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 5.3 provides that both partners and lawyers with direct supervisory
authority over non-lawyers must “make reasonable efforts to ensure . . . that
the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the
lawyer[.]”43 Rule 5.3(c) mandates that
a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of [a non-lawyer employee] that
would be a violation of the Rules of Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if[,] the
lawyer orders or . . ratifies the conduct involved[,] or if the lawyer is a partner
or [someone with] . . . managerial authority[,] . . . [and the lawyer] knows of
conduct at the time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but
fails to take reasonable remedial action.44

For judges, the operative rules in such situations include Canon 1.2 of the
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.45 This Canon states that “[a] judge
shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid
In addition,
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”46
Canon 2.12(A) of this Code stipulates that “[a] judge shall require court
staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control
to act in a manner consistent with the judge’s obligations under this
Code.”47
For lawyers, unfortunately, there has been no shortage of reminders that
they are their “digital brother’s keeper” when it comes to non-lawyer staff.
For example, in early May 2020, lawyers at Dallas-based Thompson &
42. Id. at ¶ 180.
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (AM. B. ASS’N 2022).
44. Id. at R. 5.3(c).
45. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 1.2 (AM. B. ASS’N 2022) (promoting confidence in
the judiciary).
46. Id.
47. Id. at R. 2.12(A) (listing judicial supervisory duties).
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Knight learned that the firm’s document services manager, Kevin Bain, had
made disturbing comments on Facebook related to his anger at retail
businesses requiring shoppers to wear face masks during the pandemic.48
Referring to a local grocery store’s policy, Bain posted that any business
insisting that he wear a mask “ . . . will get told to kiss my Corona ass and
will lose my business forever.”49 Following a series of threatening
comments involving his handgun proficiency, Bain went on to say, “[t]hey
have reached the limit. I have more power than they do . . . they just don’t
know it yet.”50
Thompson & Knight reacted swiftly to their employee’s social media
outburst, firing Bain for the “threatening and offensive” post.51 The firm
also released a statement, saying, “This post is a complete violation of the
values of our firm, including our commitment to the health and safety of
the communities we serve. We have terminated this individual’s
employment and notified the proper authorities about the post as a
precaution[.]”52
Of a staff member posting threatening comments online isn’t troubling
enough for lawyers, how about online conduct that threatens and “outs”
witnesses or informants as “snitches,” exposing them to intimidation,
reprisals, or even death? That was the case with Tawanna Hilliard, a
paralegal working at the United States Attorney’s Office in New Jersey.53
In August 2019, Hilliard was indicted on witness tampering, obstruction of
justice, and conspiracy charges in Brooklyn federal court.54 The paralegal
allegedly used her position and official work computer at the United States
Attorney’s Office to help her son Tyquan, a member of the Bronx 5-9 Brims
branch of the notorious Bloods street gang who was serving a 10-year prison

48. Aebra Coe, Thompson & Knight Fires Manager for COVID-19 Mask Post, LAW360 (May 9, 2020,
6:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1272075/thompson-knight-fires-manager-for-covid-19mask-post [https://perma.cc/Z3GY-ZM7G].
49. Debra Cassens Weiss, Firm Fires Staffer for ‘No More Masks’ Social Media Post that Referred to
Glock Pistol, ABA J. (May 11, 2020, 2:15 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/firm-firesstaffer-for-no-more-masks-post-that-referred-to-glock-pistol [https://perma.cc/AS8M-HDVU].
50. Coe, supra note 48.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Debra Cassens Weiss, Former Paralegal at U.S. Attorney’s Office Accused of Using Prosecutor Info to
Expose Informants, ABA J. (Aug. 16, 2019, 2:29 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
former-paralegal-at-us-attorneys-office-is-accused-of-using-prosecutor-info-to-expose-informants
[https://perma.cc/9FKT-K2S9].
54. Id.
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sentence for robbery.55 According to federal authorities, in 2016, Ms.
Hilliard, a nine-year employee, used her work computer to help her son’s
gang find cooperating witnesses, as well as to obtain the personal
information of a rival gang member whom she thought was “trying to jam
[her] son up.”56 And in 2018, during the then-pending robbery case against
her son, Hilliard allegedly posted a video on YouTube showing a post-arrest
statement given by her son’s co-defendant about the robbery in order to
prove he was “snitching.”57 She allegedly titled the video “NYC Brim Gang
Member Snitching Pt. 1,” and the video’s circulation led to the witness and
his family receiving death threats from fellow Bloods gang members.58
That video clip had been obtained by the United States Attorney’s Office
as discovery material in Tyquan Hilliard’s case.59 A search of the paralegal’s
home led to video interviews with the co-defendant and another accomplice
being found on Hilliard’s computer.60 Investigators also recovered text
messages from Ms. Hilliard in which she complained that the co-defendant
was “giving up murders, victims, shooters, and all” and that her son “has no
line of defense because his [co-defendant] told everything.”61 Hilliard
pleaded not guilty and was ordered to wear an ankle monitor, stay off social
media, and refrain from contact with her son and other gang members.62
Judges also must be wary when it comes to the online behavior of their
staff. For example, in June 2020, the Stanislaus County (California) Superior
Court was compelled to “launch[] an internal investigation after a political
tweet was posted to the court’s official Twitter account . . . .”63 The post
was a retweet of a tweet originally made by One America News personality
Alex Salvi, regarding a news item about a protester being injured during the

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.; Antonia Noori Farzan, A Gang Member’s Mother Worked in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Now
She’s Accused of Outing “Snitches,” WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
nation/2019/08/14/tawanna-hilliard-paralegal-snitches-bloods-gang/ [https://perma.cc/T762-ZS
Z3].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Sabra Stafford, Stanislaus County Court Investigating Political Comments on Official Twitter Account,
CERES COURIER (June 17, 2020, 11:31 AM), https://www.cerescourier.com/news/local/stanislauscounty-court-investigating-political-comments-official-twitter-account/ [https://perma.cc/D64K-V7
2N].
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removal of a Confederate statue in Portsmouth, Virginia.64 The retweet
attributed to the court’s account featured the comment, “Some like their
Karma instantly. I’ll take mine in November. #Trump2020.”65 The court’s
account also included a “like” of a retweet by Fox News host Jeanine Pirro
as well.66
The court reacted quickly by deleting the post and posting an apology,
along with a terse statement that the official account had been
“compromised.”67 The following day, the court’s Twitter account displayed
a more detailed tweet, reading “Yesterday’s tweet about race and partisan
politics was unauthorized and completely contrary to the Court’s mission to
provide equal access to justice and serve the needs of our community with
integrity, quality, and fairness. The Court sincerely apologizes for the
post.”68 Later, the court’s executive officer provided a statement indicating
that an unnamed employee was responsible for the political tweet, and that
an internal personnel investigation was ongoing.69 The statement promised
“appropriate action consistent with its personnel rules and applicable laws,”
and added that as a preventative measure, the court “imposed additional
restrictions on access to its social media accounts.”70
As the risks of the social media conduct of court staff members have
become more evident in the last two years, some guidance for judges has
emerged. In October 2020, the California Supreme Court Committee on
Judicial Ethics Opinions (CJEO) issued its CJEO Oral Advice Summary
2020-037, entitled “Judicial Obligations Relating to Social Media Comments
by Appellate Court Staff.”71 In this opinion, the Committee mandates not
only vigilance on the part of an appellate justice regarding staff members’
online conduct but action as well when that justice becomes aware of posts
or comments that violate judicial canons.72 The Committee calls for the
justice to “immediately take steps to remedy the ethical violation, including

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Cal. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Jud. Ethics Ops., CJEO Oral Advice Summary 2020-037 1 (2020),
https://www.judicialethicsopinions.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/CJEO-Oral-Advice-Summary-2020
-037.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE85-TACK].
72. Id. at 2.
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at a minimum requiring the staff member to take all reasonable steps to have
the post taken down and removed from the public domain.”73
The opinion begins by taking note of the realities of life and work in the
Digital Age, observing that social media “has taken the place of both the
proverbial office water cooler and the town square.”74 Appellate court
staff, the Committee explains, are no different from other members of the
general public, and it should come as no surprise that their posts will
frequently refer to their employment at the court.75 And while
acknowledging that court employees are not prohibited from posting
comments about the courts or their employment generally, the Committee
reminds justices that, these same employees “are required to keep
confidential the decision making process of a court with respect to any
pending matter,” and that the canons “constrain the content of any such
comment.”76
In particular, the Committee points to California’s Canon 3B(9) and
3C(3).77 Canon 3B(9) provides:
A judge shall not make any public comment about a pending or impending
proceeding in any court, and shall not make any nonpublic comment that
might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. The judge shall require
similar abstention on the part of staff and court personnel subject to the
judge’s direction and control.78

Canon 3C(3) states:
A judge shall require staff and court personnel under the judge’s direction and
control to observe appropriate standards of conduct and to refrain from (a)
manifesting bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, gender,
gender identity, gender expression, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or
political affiliation, or (b) sexual harassment in the performance of their
official duties.79

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at n.2.
Id.
CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 3B(9)(a),(b) (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2020).
CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 3C(3) (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2020).
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The opinion goes on to note that appellate justices face discipline if they
fail to exercise such “reasonable control and direction” over their staff—
and cites at least one California example.80 But what action must a justice
take? At a minimum, the Committee cautions the justices to “instruct the
staff member to take all reasonable steps to delete or to have removed from
public view any improper comment that violates the canons, and then
follow up with the staff member to ensure that they have done so.”81
Practically speaking, however, given the viral nature of the internet, a
controversial post or tweet can live on and be further disseminated thanks
to a screenshot being preserved by an original recipient or other third party,
and subsequent deletion or other efforts at obscuring the post will
consequently be futile.82 In that event, the opinion states, “the justice may
need to instruct the staff member to correct or repudiate the comment on
social media, particularly if the comment is demeaning or offensive, or
otherwise undermines the dignity of the court.”83
Another judicial ethics advisory opinion was issued in 2020 addressing
the conduct of judicial law clerks and externs on social media, particularly
insofar as it related to the judicial obligation to supervise.84 Prompted by
“recent events concerning systematic racial inequalities,” Colorado Judicial
Ethics Advisory Board Opinion 2020-02 took a different perspective.85
Instead of the danger of online comments by judges or their staff about
pending or impending proceedings, Opinion 2020-02 focused on the extent
to which judges, law clerks, and externs may participate in protest
demonstrations and may use social media posts “[to condemn] racism and
to express general support for various reforms being discussed in the public
arena.”86 While acknowledging that judicial clerks and externs are not
subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct’s jurisdiction, the Opinion reminds
80. Cal. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Jud. Ethics Ops., CJEO Oral Advice Summary 2020-037 3 (2020),
https://www.judicialethicsopinions.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/CJEO-Oral-Advice-Summary-2020
-037.pdf [[https://perma.cc/HE85-TACK] (citing Letter of Public Admonishment of Commissioner
Mark Kliszewski (2017) (explaining a 2017 judicial disciplinary proceeding in which the commissioner’s
failure to take corrective action to halt court staff from making inappropriate comments was held to
have violated Canons 3B(4) and 3C(3)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Colo. Sup. Ct., Colo. Jud. Ethics Advisory Bd. Advisory Opinion 2020–02 (2020)
(discussing clerks’ “participation in protest demonstration, use of social media, and other public
statements”).
85. Id. at 1.
86. Id.
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us that judges, in their supervisory capacity, “remain responsible for
ensuring that their staff and others subject to the judge’s direction act in a
manner consistent with the Code.”87 Because the behavior of a “[law] clerk
or extern may be imputed to the judge” for whom he or she works, trial and
appellate judges must require staff under their direction and control to act
as a judge would under the Code.88
Colorado’s Board placed particular emphasis on Rule 2.12 of the
Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that “[a] judge shall
require court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction
and control to act in a manner consistent with the judge’s obligations under
this Code.”89 Colorado’s Rule is identical to Rule 2.12 of the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct.90 That “Rule[] was reworded to reflect a more
[rigorous] . . . standard[]”—that “court staff [members] act in a manner
consistent with all of a judge’s [ethical] obligations under the Code and not
simply those previously enumerated in Canon 3C(2) . . . .”91 As the
Report’s explanation of changes to the Model Code indicated, this more
rigorous standard was intended to reflect the critical place occupied by
judicial staff in the justice system: “not only in terms of their role into the
administration of justice but also in terms of their relevance to preserving
public confidence in the system as a whole.”92
Because of this critical role, with court staff essentially viewed by the
public as an extension of their judge, Colorado’s Board made it clear that
higher expectations are at work here.93 A judge’s responsibility for the
conduct of his or her staff is not just limited to when such staff members
are acting at the judge’s direction or control, or even during working hours
only.94 In the current climate of polarized political discourse and
heightened attention to racial justice issues, this takes on new urgency.
Colorado Judicial Ethics Advisory Board Opinion 2020-02 observes that
while several state supreme courts around the country have issued
statements concerning racial inequality, there is a dramatic difference
between permissible statements like that and participation in protest
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1; COLO. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.12 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 2010).
Colo. Sup. Ct., Colo. Jud. Ethics Advisory Bd. Advisory Opinion 2020–02, at 2 (2020).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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marches and rallies (such as Black Lives Matter protests or a “March for
Science” gathering) or using social media to express support for or to protest
current political issues.95
As the Colorado Opinion notes, the use of social media by judges to
speak out on current political issues raises a number of ethical concerns,
including “(1) avoiding impropriety in all conduct; (2) not lending the
prestige of judicial office; (3) not detracting from the dignity of the
court . . . ; (4) not engaging in prohibited political activity; and (5) avoiding
association with [] issues . . .” that might come before the court.96 For that
reason, the Opinion warns judges to “not make political or divisive
statements” themselves.97 And because of Rule 2.12’s mandate, judges
must counsel their law clerks, externs, and other staff against making
comments “that are divisive and venture into the political sphere,”
regardless of whether those comments are “made in person, in writing, [or]
on social media . . . .”98
III. JUDGES AND THE ETHICAL RISKS OF “BENIGN”
SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVITY
Looming even larger than Canon 2.12(A)’s mandate that “judges . .
require [their staff] . . . to act in a manner consistent with the judges’ ethical
obligations . . .”99—the “guilt for the sins of others” standard, if you will—
is Canon 1.2’s admonition for judges to act at all times in a manner that
“promotes public confidence in the . . . impartiality of the judiciary [and to
avoid not only] impropriety [but also] the appearance of impropriety.”100
This broad but vital standard encompasses a judge’s “active” misconduct on
social media, including such things as ex parte communications with counsel,
inappropriate sexual overtures to parties, and discussing a case on social
media.101 Understandably, this “active” misconduct attracts the lion’s share
of attention when judicial misuse of social media is discussed. However, the
arguably more “benign” types of activities on social media—liking or
sharing the posts or tweets of a party or someone associated with a party to
a case pending before the judge, “following” a party or someone associated
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 5–7.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.12(a) (Am. B. Ass’n 2022).
Id. at R. 1.2.
Browning, supra note 13, at 490, 498, 500.
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with a party, and so forth—can be no less concerning. In a way, it is more
troubling because it is not as overt, as blatant, as more “active” misconduct
on social media. If commenting on a case on Facebook or ex parte
communications with a party is an ethical iceberg,102 the “benign” acts like
a judge following one of the parties or counsel appearing before her and
liking their tweets or posts is that portion of the iceberg unseen below the
water: invisible, but no less dangerous for the unwary.
One reason why judges get into ethically compromising situations arising
out of such benign conduct on social media is because they may view it as
harmless, rather than as behavior that can raise questions about their
impartiality or create at least the appearance of impropriety.103 Likes on
social media platforms signify validation, approval, agreement, support, and
even endorsement of the post or tweet itself.104 Likes and follows have
commercial significance, as indicated by the billions of dollars spent annually
by brands on establishing and maintaining a social media presence.105
The business valuation of an entity’s Twitter followers and similar forms of
social media metrics has become a recurring issue in Digital Age
litigation.106 In addition, a number of studies have documented the
psychological value of garnering likes and followers, and the impact such
“engagement metrics” can have on an individual’s wellbeing.107
“Likes” on social media have significance. In fact, as a United States
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision has recognized, clicking “like” on a social
media page is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment.108
102. Id. at 509–10.
103. Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 642, at 2 (2013) (highlighting
potential Model Rules violations caused by judges’ use of ESM).
104. Branwell Moffat, The Power of Likes on Social Media: Friend or Foe?, THE FUTURE OF COM.
(Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.the-future-of-commerce.com/2019/10/07/the-power-of-likes-on-social
-media/ [https://perma.cc/2C6Q-9JNA].
105. Leslie K. John et al., What’s the Value of a Like?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar.–Apr. 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/03/whats-the-value-of-a-like [https://perma.cc/3YWY-XPMR].
106. See Phonedog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8,
2011) (bringing an action based on a former employee’s use of a company Twitter account containing
trade secrets); see also Michael Furlong, Putting a Price on Friendship: Examining the Ownership Battle Between
a Business’ Social Media Networks, and the Humans That Operate Them, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 745 (2013)
(“[M]any companies appoint employees to operate a social media accounts on behalf of the
business . . . . It can [] become ambiguous as to whether the employee or employer has ownership
rights over the account. Such ambiguity can cause problems for the business.”).
107. See generally The Psychology of Being ‘Liked’ on Social Media, MEDIUM.COM (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://medium.com/swlh/likes-on-social-media-87bfff679602 [https://perma.cc/GQM2-WASE]
(noting a psychological response to receiving ‘likes’ on social media).
108. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386–87 (4th Cir. 2013).
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“Liking” a political campaign page, for example, can constitute an
endorsement in clear violation of ABA Model Rule of Judicial
Conduct 4.1(A)(3)’s prohibition on judges’ “publicly endorsing or opposing
a candidate for any public office[.]”109 Some judges have learned this the
hard way, and been disciplined for casually “liking” another individual’s
campaign Facebook page.110 For example, Butler County, Kansas District
Judge Jan Satterfield caused a controversy in 2012 when she was among
several dozen people who clicked “like” on a Facebook post by the
campaign of Sheriff Kelly Herzet.111 A supporter of Herzet’s opponent
filed a complaint against Judge Satterfield with the Kansas Commission of
Judicial Qualifications, noting that “[w]ith the growth of social media, the
court system needs to define how its rules for judges apply in
cyberspace.”112 Judge Satterfield, for her part, did not seem to understand
how her “like” could be viewed as an endorsement.113
Clearly, a judge engaging on social media with one party, or someone
associated with that party (such as counsel), in some way to the exclusion of
the other side calls into question that judge’s impartiality, and can undermine
public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Even when the social
engagement seems benign or innocuous, such as following someone on
Twitter and liking or retweeting a tweet, that “heart” icon can send a
message of approval or affiliation. While it may be unintended, it can also
convey to observers the impression that one side or viewpoint enjoys a
special or favored position with the judge.114 And while many judges might
be followers of certain media outlets or specific journalists—a fact that, in
isolation, is harmless enough—a judge’s liking, sharing, or retweeting an
article that is written about a case pending before that judge can be ethically
problematic,115 particularly if that article takes an editorial stance regarding
109. MODEL RULE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(3) (AM. B. ASS’N 2022).
110. See, e.g., Kansas Judge Causes Stir with Facebook ‘Like’, REALCLEARPOLITICS (July 29, 2012),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/news/ap/politics/2012/Jul/29/kansas_judge_causes_stir_with_f
acebook__like_.html [https://perma.cc/T3VV-WKCD] (describing an instance where “liking” a
campaign Facebook page was violative of the Model Rules because it “publicly endors[ed] or oppos[ed]
another candidate for any public office.”).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. (suggesting the act of “liking” a Facebook post “could be construed as showing
bias . . . .”).
115. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a)(12) (AM. B. ASS’N 2022) (“[A] judge . . .
shall not . . . make any statement that would reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair
the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any court . . . .”).
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a party or key issue involved in the case. Is subjecting a judge to recusal or
even disciplinary sanction an appropriate response to concerns over the
integrity of the judiciary and the appearance of impropriety? Or is such a
“guilt by association” standard unduly harsh? To answer these questions,
we should look at a handful of cautionary tales: one that reached the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, another that reached the Ninth Circuit, and a
trio of recusal cases from Texas.116
A. Judge Michael Bitney
Our first example is Barron County Circuit Court Judge Michael Bitney
of Wisconsin.117 In 2017, Judge Bitney presided over a contested hearing
in a custody dispute between mother Angela Carroll and father
Timothy Miller.118 After the hearing, but before rendering a decision,
Judge Bitney accepted a Facebook “friend” request from Carroll.119 Over
the course of the next twenty-five days, Carroll “liked” sixteen of the judge’s
Facebook posts, “loved” two more, commented on two of his posts, and
shared and “liked” several third-party posts that related to a contested issue
at the hearing (domestic violence).120 Judge Bitney did not “like” or
comment on any of Carroll’s posts, nor did he reply to any of her comments
on his posts.121 However, the judge never disclosed the Facebook
friendship or Ms. Carroll’s communications, and he ultimately ruled entirely
in the mother’s favor.122
On the same day as his decision, Ms. Carroll posted “the Honorable Judge
has granted everything we requested.”123 Miller, the husband, discovered
the Facebook connection and moved for reconsideration of the ruling and
for Judge Bitney’s disqualification.124 While Judge Bitney admitted to the

116. In re Paternity of B.J.M., 944 N.W.2d 542, 547 (Wis. 2020); United States v. Sierra Pac.
Indus., 862 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2017); Youkers v. State, 400 S.W.3d 200, 203–05 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2013, pet. ref’d); In re Hon. Michelle Slaughter, 480 S.W.3d 842, 845–46 (Tex. Spec. Ct. of Rev.
2015); Tex. Ethics Comm’n v. Sullivan, No. 02-15-00103-CV, 2015 WL 6759306, at *1, *1–*2
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 5, 2015, pet. denied).
117. In re Paternity of B.J.M., 944 N.W.2d 542, 543–44 (Wis. 2020).
118. Id. at 544.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 544–45.
121. Id. at 545.
122. Id. at 546.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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Facebook interactions, he maintained that he was impartial.125 The
appellate court reversed and remanded the case with directions to have it
heard before a different judge.126 On appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, the high court affirmed the appellate decision, concluding that “the
extreme facts of this case rebut the presumption of judicial impartiality and
establish a due process violation.”127
The Wisconsin Supreme Court based its conclusion that “a serious risk
of actual bias” had been shown by the totality of the circumstances.128
These included the timing of the Facebook friendship—it was sent after
evidence and briefing were submitted, implying Carroll’s desire to influence
the Judge’s decision, and Judge Bitney accepted it, gaining access to off-therecord facts relevant to the dispute; the volume of Carroll’s posts and the
likelihood Judge Bitney viewed these posts and comments; the content of
the Facebook activity as it related to the nature of the pending proceeding—
Carroll had essentially twenty-five more days to portray herself in the best
possible light through her Facebook access to the judge; and Judge Bitney’s
lack of disclosure—which deprived Miller of an opportunity to refute what
Carroll was posting and sharing.129
The court observed that while it was not determining the “general
propriety” of judicial use of social media, it cautioned that judges should
recognize that online interactions, like real-world interactions, must be
treated with a degree of care.130 In her concurring opinion, Justice Ziegler
urged even more vigilance, reminding judges that their social media use
“may expose both the judge and the judiciary as a whole to an appearance
of bias or impropriety.”131
B. Judge William Shubb
In a case that nearly reached the United States Supreme Court, a federal
judge asked to recuse himself because of his Twitter activity.132 In the 2017
case of United States v. Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc.,133 United States District
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 550–51.
Id. at 569 (Dallet, J., concurring).
Id. at 567 (Ziegler, J., concurring).
United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc., 862 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc., 862 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2017).
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Court Judge William B. Shubb was presiding over a case arising out of a
2007 wildfire that had devastated nearly 46,000 acres in California.134
The federal government, which blamed lumber producer Sierra Pacific,
reached a settlement that the lumber company sought to vacate.135
Judge Shubb denied Sierra Pacific’s motion.136 It appealed, pointing out
that not only was Judge Shubb a Twitter follower of the federal prosecutors
on the case—and had received tweets about the merits of the case from the
prosecutors’ Twitter account—but also that he himself had tweeted about
the case from his then-public Twitter account (@Nostalgist1).137
On the same day that Judge Shubb denied Sierra Pacific’s motion to set
aside the settlement, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern
District of California posted multiple tweets about the case.138 In addition,
Judge Shubb tweeted a link to a news article about his ruling, bearing the
headline Sierra Pacific Still Liable for Moonlight Fire Damage.139 This
irked the lumber giant, which had expressly denied liability as part of the
settlement.140 The defendants appealed, arguing (among other grounds)
that the judge had violated multiple Canons of the Code of Conduct for
United States Judges.141 This included Canon 2, calling for judges “to avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities”;142
Canon 3A(4), prohibiting “ex parte communications or any communications
concerning a pending or impending matter that are made outside the
presence of the parties or their lawyers”;143 and Canon 3A(6), mandating
that “a judge should not make public comment on the merits of a matter
pending or impending in any court.”144 Sierra Pacific also argued that,
under Canon 3C, Judge Shubb was required to “disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”145

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1164–65.
Id. at 1166.
Id. at 1174–75.
Id. at 1166.
Id.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1173.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1173–74.
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While the case was on appeal, the federal prosecutors notified Judge
Shubb that his Twitter activity had become an issue.146 Shortly thereafter,
the judge changed his Twitter account from “public” to “protected,” a
privacy setting permitting only certain authorized followers to view his
tweets.147
In July 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the trial court’s ruling and declined to require Judge Shubb’s
recusal on procedural grounds.148 However, the Court recognized the
significance of the issue arising out of Judge Shubb’s Twitter activity, stating,
“[T]his case is a cautionary tale about the possible pitfalls of judges engaging
in social media activity relating to pending cases, and we reiterate the
importance of maintaining the appearance of propriety both on and off the
bench.”149
Undaunted, Sierra Pacific filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court.150 The question presented asked whether a
district court judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned “when he
not only follows the prosecution on social media, but also, just hours after
denying relief to the opposing party, tweets a headline and link to a news
article concerning the proceedings pending before him.”151 Despite the
questions raised, in June 2018, the United States Supreme Court denied the
petition for writ of certiorari.152
C. Judge Steve Burgess
To date, there have been only two appellate cases in Texas dealing with
judicial use of social media. In Youkers v. State,153 while the Fifth Court of
Appeals rejected the notion that a judge’s Facebook friendship alone was
disqualifying, it did note that social media use by judges “presents concerns
unique to the role of the judiciary in our justice system,” and that in using
such platforms, “judges must be mindful of their responsibilities under
146. David Lat, A Federal Judge and His Twitter Account: A Cautionary Tale, ABOVE THE L.
(Nov. 18, 2015, 4:48 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2015/11/a-federal-judge-and-his-twitteraccount-a-cautionary-tale/ [https://perma.cc/DR5B-GLEA].
147. Id.
148. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc., 862 F.3d at 1175.
149. Id. at 1175–76.
150. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2675
(2018) (No. 17-1153).
151. Id. at ii.
152. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2675, 2675 (2018).
153. Youkers v. State, 400 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. ref’d).
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applicable judicial codes of conduct.”154 And in In re Honorable Michelle
Slaughter,155 a Special Court of Review appointed by the Texas Supreme
Court observed that while social media activity of the judge at issue—who
had been recused in connection with Facebook posts about the case before
her—did not warrant judicial discipline, judges should nevertheless be aware
that their conduct on social media is subject to existing rules of judicial
conduct and that such online behavior by judges about their own
proceedings “create the very real possibility of a recusal (or even a mistrial)
and may detract from the public trust and confidence in the administration
of justice.”156
But instead of a retweet or a like, what about a judge who follows one of
the parties on Twitter? That was the question posed in a 2015 Texas case,
Texas Ethics Commission v. Michael Quinn Sullivan.157 In that case, the Texas
Ethics Commission (TEC), a state agency charged with administering and
enforcing statutes governing elections and related governmental processes,
filed an action against Sullivan (a conservative activist and president of an
influential conservative-leaning organization) for failure to register as a
political lobbyist.158 Sullivan appealed the TEC’s decision in that case by
filing suit in Denton County, Texas, his alleged county of residence.159 The
TEC disputed his residency and filed a motion to transfer venue;160 Sullivan
responded by filing a motion to dismiss the TEC’s claims under Texas’s
anti-SLAPP law.161 On February 18, 2015, the case was heard by
Judge Steve Burgess of the 158th Judicial District Court, and he denied the
motion to transfer venue and granted Sullivan’s motion to dismiss.162
That same day, however, a reporter for the Fort Worth Star-Telegram
tweeted about the hearing, noting that Judge Burgess was a Twitter follower
of Sullivan.163 The next day, the same reporter posted on Twitter that
“1 day after ruling in [Sullivan’s] favor without disclosing he’s a Twitter

154. Id. at 2–5.
155. In re Hon. Michelle Slaughter, 480 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. Spec. Ct. of Rev. 2015).
156. Id. at 852.
157. Tex. Ethics Comm’n v. Sullivan, No. 02-15-00103-CV, 2015 WL 6759306, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Nov. 5, 2015, pet. denied).
158. Id. at *1.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *2.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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follower, judge deletes account.”164 On February 23, the TEC filed a
motion to recuse Judge Burgess, arguing that the jurist’s following of
Sullivan on Twitter not only called into question Burgess’s impartiality but
also made it likely that Burgess and Sullivan had ex parte communications
through use of the platform.165 The later accusation had no foundation;
for two Twitter users to communicate privately, both must follow each
other166—and there was no indication that Sullivan likewise followed
Judge Burgess. Moreover, it was hardly unusual that an elected Republican
judge like Steve Burgess, in a decidedly Republican county and state, might
choose to follow the Twitter account of the leader of an influential
conservative organization known for its endorsements of Republican
political candidates—including judges. Certainly, there was no indication
that, out of the nearly 15,000 of Sullivan’s Twitter followers, Judge Burgess
and Sullivan enjoyed any real relationship.
Despite all of this, another judge was appointed to hear the recusal
motion, and that judge granted it.167 Should following a party automatically
warrant recusal? Courts and judicial ethics opinions in multiple jurisdictions
have already addressed the question of a judge’s Facebook friendships with
parties, counsel, and even expert witnesses, with most noting that such a
tenuous connection is not disqualifying—absent other indications of a
special relationship, position of influence, or the potential for bias.168
In Judge Burgess’s case, the appearance of impropriety was likely not helped
by either his failure to disclose the connection or by the deletion of his
Twitter account after the journalist’s revelation.

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. But see How to Direct Message (DM) on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.
twitter.com/en/using-twitter/direct-messages [https://perma.cc/GLY6-EXWK] (“You can start a
private conversation or create a group conversation with anyone who follows you. Anyone you do not
follow can sent you a Direct Message if: [y]ou have opted in to receive Direct Messages from anyone[]
or; [y]ou have previously sent that person a Direct Message. . . . For some . . . account settings may
already be set to receive message requests from other people you do not follow. These requests are
kept separate from your other DMs until you accept them.”).
167. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 2015 WL 6759306, at *2; John Reynolds, A Twitter Follow Leads to a
Recusal, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/03/05/twitter-follow-leadsrecusal/ [https://perma.cc/B3AX-2KC6].
168. See, e.g., Law Offices of Herssein & Herssein, P.A. v. United Services Auto. Ass’n,
271 So.3d 889, 897 (Fla. 2018) (“The clear majority position is that mere Facebook “friendship”
between a judge and an attorney appearing before the judge, without more, does not create thence of
impropriety under the applicable code of judicial conduct.”).
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D. Judge Staci Williams
In 2016, Judge Staci Williams of Dallas County’s 101st Judicial District
Court was presiding over State Fair of Texas v. Riggs & Ray, P.C.169 The
lawsuit had been brought by the ostensibly nonprofit corporation that
oversees the annual State Fair of Texas against an Austin law firm that had
filed an open records request seeking “extensive financial records, contracts,
and correspondence” between fair executives and various Dallas
government officials.170 The litigation was closely followed and covered by
certain local journalists, including on Twitter. Beginning in November 2016,
Judge Williams’s activity on her official Twitter account began to attract the
plaintiff’s attention.171 In July, she retweeted, without comment, a tweet
by a local radio host and political commentator referencing the case, linking
to an article sympathetic to the defendant’s position, and praising the
judge.172 On another date, Judge Williams had liked a tweet by a Dallas
City Council member that linked to another news article by a different
journalist that was, again, sharply critical of the plaintiff and its position.173
In Twitter parlance, retweeting without comment or indication of
disagreement is commonly understood to signify approval, while likes are
usually understood to show appreciation for a tweet. Reacting to the judge’s
retweet and like—publicly posted approval by Judge Williams of tweets
linked to reporting that was highly critical of one party’s position in the
case—the plaintiff filed a motion to recuse on November 29, 2016.174 In
December, Judge Williams voluntarily recused herself and asked for a new
169. Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal, at 1, State Fair of Tex. v. Riggs & Ray, P.C.,
2015 WL 9941838 (101st Dist. Ct., Dallas County, 2016) (No. DC-15-04484).
170. Id. at 32.
171. Id. at 2.
172. Id. at 3–4.
173. Id. at 7. The articles in question included two pieces by Jim Schutze in the Dallas Observer.
Both articles, along with screenshots from Judge Williams’ Twitter account, were exhibits to the
motion. See Jim Schutze, Take an Embarrassing Peek into the Love Between the State Fair of Texas and
Fair Park, DALL. OBSERVER (June 9, 2016), https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/take-anembarrassing-peek-into-the-love-between-the-state-fair-of-texas-and-fair-park-8374766
[https://
perma.cc/E3P5-ENEK] (arguing the park board is giving away the Fair Park land wrongly); see also Jim
Schutze, Transparency Isn’t Just Important in Fair Park Debate. It’s the Whole Enchilada, DALL. OBSERVER
(July 20, 2016), https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/transparency-isnt-just-important-in-fair-parkdebate-its-the-whole-enchilada-8504231 [https://perma.cc/VHS3-B74T] (“The specific questions the
State Fair of Texas board has been ducking, dodging, suing and gluing people over in the last year have
to do with alleged kickbacks from vendors, conflicts of interest, side-deals, financial arrangements with
the cops, a slew of things.”).
174. Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal, supra note 169, at 1.
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judge to be assigned to the case.175 Regardless of whether this Twitter
activity truly reflected a lack of impartiality, one can certainly understand
why one party might question the judge’s impartiality; at the very least, such
activity created the appearance of bias or impropriety.
E. Judge Glen Harrison
In 2015, Judge Glen Harrison of West Texas’ 32nd Judicial District
presided over a complex breach of contract case against attorney and
businessman Kerwin Stephens by several individuals and entities over a
speculative project to buy (and later sell) oil and gas leases in Fisher County,
Texas.176 The case resulted in a verdict of over $96 million.177 In addition
to making a number of rulings adverse to the defense during the trial itself,
later in 2015, and well into 2016, Judge Harrison denied a variety of
defendants’ motions for post-trial relief, including a motion for new trial, a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motions regarding the
entry of judgement, and a motion pertaining to the defendants’ ability to
supersede the judgment.178 Baffled by rulings they felt were inconsistent
with Texas law, the defendants took the case up on appeal.179 On appeal,
the Eastland Court of Appeals embraced most of the JNOV arguments that
Judge Harrison had rejected, and also allowed Stephens the supersedeas that
Harrison had denied not once, but three times.180 Although Stephens was
compelled to file for bankruptcy protection regardless, the appellate court’s
rulings greatly diminished a verdict that had been hailed in 2015 as one of
the largest of that year not only in Fisher County, Texas,181 and perhaps
nationally as well. The appellate rulings constituted a sharp rebuke of the
trial court.

175. Signed Order of Referral on Motion to Recuse, Cause No. DC-15-04484, State Fair of
Tex. v. Riggs & Ray, P.C. (101st Dist. Ct., Dallas County, 2016) (on file with author).
176. Stephens v. Three Finger Black Shale P’ship, 580 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2019, pet. denied).
177. Id. at 696–97.
178. Brief in Support of Debtor’s Application for Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) &
Bankruptcy Rule 2014 Authorizing the Employment of John G. Browning as Expert Witness at 3, 8,
9, In re Stephens, No. 21-40817-elm-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2021), EFC No. 173; Response to
Plaintiff’s Brief on Recusal at 2, In re Stephens, No. 21-40817-elm-11, ECF No. 241.
179. Stephens, 580 S.W.3d at 696.
180. Id. at 732.
181. Paul DeBenedetto, Texas Jury Awards $60M In Mineral Rights Partner Suit, LAW360
(Aug. 21, 2015, 6:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/693952/print?section=commercial
contracts [https://perma.cc/QB7F-3WE6].
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During the bankruptcy proceeding, as the court contemplated a remand
to the state trial court on several issues, Stephens alerted his legal team to
some disturbing revelations he had recently learned about, discoveries that
led them to point out reasons for Judge Harrison’s recusal.182
An examination of Judge Harrison’s activity on Twitter during and after
the trial (using the Twitter handle @gharrison32nd) revealed some
interesting things. Judge Harrison had apparently begun following at least
one of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, Jordyn Gingras, and on August 20, 2015—just
one day after the trial’s conclusion—Judge Harrison liked a tweet by
Gingras.183 The tweet in question said, “[t]he truth doesn’t cost you
anything but a lie could cost you everything,” an apparent reference to the
trial; it was accompanied by the hashtags “#proudlawyermoment,”
“#rumbleinroby,” and “#sweetwaterstrong” (references to the trial’s
location).184 The same day, Judge Harrison liked Gingras’ tweet about the
“new friends” she’d made in Sweetwater and Roby, a tweet that contained
a hyperlink to an Instagram post with the Stephens trial-related hashtags
“#wefilledthebucket,” “#sweetwaterproud,” “#rumbleinroby,” and
“#proudlawyermoment.”185 Just two days later, on August 22, 2015, Judge
Harrison liked yet another tweet by Gingras, this time thanking her
paralegal, Amber Schrandt.186
Later, there would be more likes coming from Judge Harrison in response
to tweets by Ms. Gingras. On November 16, 2015, before the hearing on
Stephen’s JNOV motion, Judge Harrison liked Gingras’ tweet about a CLE
presentation she gave to the Dallas Bar Association about the subject matter
of the trial entitled “Landman or Lawyer? $70MM+ Reasons Why You
Should Care.”187 Not long after entering judgment against defendant
Stephens on March 30, 2016, Judge Harrison liked a tweet by another
member of the team suing Stephens, Christina Mullen, boasting about
obtaining the “#15 verdict in the nation.”188 Days later, on May 24, 2016,
Harrison liked yet another tweet by attorney Gingras, this time tweeting a
182. Response to Plaintiff’s Brief on Recusal at 2, In re Stephens, No. 21-40817-elm-11, ECF
No. 241.
183. Brief in Support of Debtor’s Application for Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) &
Bankruptcy Rule 2014 Authorizing the Employment of John G. Browning as Expert Witness at 5, In
re Stephens, No. 21-40817-elm-11, EFC No. 173.
184. Id. at 6.
185. Id. at 29–30.
186. Id. at 32–33.
187. Id. at 6, 35.
188. Id. at 7, 39.
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positive article about two more of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, Frank and
Debbie Branson.189 And on June 29, 2016, not long before denying
Stephens’ efforts at supersedeas, Judge Harrison liked yet another of
Gingras’ trial-related tweets—this time one about receiving “top billing” on
the 2015 Top Texas Verdicts and Settlement Report.190
Indeed, Judge Harrison continued to follow Twitter accounts associated
with Ms. Gingras and other members of the trial team suing Kerwin
Stephens. What’s more, his Twitter interactions, including likes of tweets
by Ms. Gingras, continued as well. Collectively, all of this Twitter activity—
particularly the fact that Judge Harrison followed and commented (in the
form of likes) on tweets by one side of the litigants in a matter before him—
is indicative at the very least of the appearance of impartiality and
prejudgment against Kerwin Stephens and his related entities. And while
judicial rulings are rarely enough by themselves to demonstrate bias
sufficient to warrant recusal, the fact that a presiding judge made rulings that
were incorrect191 and in favor of the side of the case he followed and
commented on via Twitter would tend to reinforce concerns about
impartiality. Following, liking the tweets of, and referencing lawyers on only
one side of what was a high stakes and contentious piece of litigation
(including tweets that referenced the size and newsworthiness of the verdict)
cannot help but foster objectively reasonable doubts as to Judge Harrison’s
impartiality.
The fact that this Twitter engagement apparently did not occur during
the trial itself is of no consequence; it occurred during a period of time in
which Judge Harrison maintained jurisdiction over pending post-trial
matters. In New Mexico v. Thomas,192 a case in which a relatively new trial
judge posted on Facebook about how “[j]ustice was served” after a murder
trial but before sentencing, the New Mexico Supreme Court was not amused
by the judge’s “Facebook page discussions of his role in the case and his
opinion of the outcome.”193 After reversing the conviction on other
grounds, the court cautioned that:

189. Id. at 41.
190. Id.
191. See Stephens, 580 S.W.3d at 732 (holding at least three times out of five, according to the
Eastland Court of Appeals).
192. New Mexico v. Thomas, 376 P.3d 184 (N.M. 2016).
193. Id. at 189, 198.
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Judges must avoid not only actual impropriety but also its appearance, and
judges must “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.” These
limitations apply with equal force to virtual actions and online comments and
must be kept in mind if and when a judge decides to participate in electronic
social media.194

Does it matter whether Judge Harrison’s Twitter activity demonstrated
actual bias or prejudice? No, because, under Texas law, that is not the
standard.195 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b(b)(1) provides that a trial
judge “must recuse” when “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.”196 The test for recusal under such circumstances is “whether
a reasonable member of the public at large, knowing all the facts in the
public domain concerning the judge’s conduct, would have a reasonable
doubt that the judge is actually impartial.”197 Under well-settled Texas law,
it is not a showing of actual bias or prejudice that matters so much as the
appearance of partiality, bias, or prejudice.198 As the Texas Supreme Court
noted decades ago—more than 40 years before the advent of social media:
The judiciary must not only attempt to give all parties a fair trial, but it must
also try to maintain the trust and confidence of the public at a high level . . . .
[And] it is of great importance that the courts should be free from reproach
or the suspicion of unfairness.199

Given such legitimate concerns about the appearance of partiality or bias
stemming from Judge Harrison’s following and likes of one side’s tweets
referencing the case before him, it is not surprising that on November 19,
2021, the United States bankruptcy judge entered an order granting Kerwin
Stephens’ Motion to Remand without prejudice to his right to seek

194. Id. at 198 (citations omitted) (quoting N.M. Code. Jud. Cond. R. 21-102).
195. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b) (explaining when a judge must recuse themselves and lacking
mention of demonstrable actual bias or prejudice).
196. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b)(1).
197. Drake v. Walker, 529 S.W.3d 516, 528 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hansen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 346 S.W.3d 769, 776
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.)).
198. See id. (testing, not for actual bias, but for whether a reasonable person would think the
judge was biased).
199. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. McGee, 356 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex. 1962).
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Harrison’ recusal.200 Nor is it surprising that after being informed of this
ruling and of the basis for Stephens’ seeking his recusal,
Judge Glen Harrison entered a voluntary order recusing himself and
requesting that another judge be appointed to preside over all matters in this
case.201
IV. CONCLUSION
In considering the ethical dimensions of judicial use of social media, it is
easy to focus on the obvious: the overt activity that crosses ethical
boundaries like online commenting about cases, ex parte communications,
and engaging in inappropriate commenting or communications with
individuals. Sadly, such egregious examples of judicial misbehavior recur
with regularity and attract media attention when they do.202 However,
more passive or benign conduct like following one side of a litigated matter
on social media and/or liking, sharing, or retweeting their online posts is
just as troubling and poses just as much of a threat to public confidence in
the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. And just like
that portion of the iceberg lurking beneath the waves, it can be more difficult
to discover.
In our current technology-driven world, we must be increasingly wary,
not only of our own digital personas, but of those commenting on our posts.
The role of being our “digital brother’s keeper” is one that is increasingly
200. Adversary Case No. 21-04021-elm, In re Kerwin Stephens et al., Order Granting Motion
to Remand (Nov. 19, 2021), Doc. No. 70 (copy on file with author).
201. Cause No. DC2013-0016, Voluntary Order of Recusal (Dec. 23, 2021) (copy on file with
author).
202. See Judge Rebuked for Sending Inappropriate Messages to Women Via Social Media,
WBIR.COM (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.wbir.com/article/news/local/judge-rebuked-for-sendinginappropriate-messages-to-women-via-social-media/51-37da05a6-fc91-4101-8d30-3ca1abcdb5b1
[https://perma.cc/NUU6-J3ZL]
(discussing
the
2020
reprimand
of
Tennessee
Judge Johnathan Lee Young for sending “inappropriate messages” to multiple women over a period
of years, several of whom were litigants in his court); see also Ottawa County Common Pleas Court Judge
Sanctioned Over Improper Facebook Use, 12ABC.COM (Aug. 17, 2021, 8:43 AM), https://www.
13abc.com/2021/08/17/ottawa-co-common-pleas-court-judge-sanctioned-over-improper-facebookuse/ [https://perma.cc/XYH6-4U97] (discussing the six month suspension issued by the Ohio
Supreme Court to Ottawa County Judge Bruce Winters for communicating via Facebook with an
offender with civil and criminal matters before the judge); see also Ex-NC State Judge Censured for Sexual
Misconduct on the Job, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (June 11, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/
government-and-politics-nc-state-wire-censures-sexual-misconduct-d0aab938012c73391128b9751176
ddbc [https://perma.cc/GDH8-ZA9X] (discussing the 2021 censure by the North Carolina Supreme
Court of former District Court Judge C. Randy Pool for sexual misconduct in the form of inappropriate
Facebook messages to thirty-five women).
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placed on average citizens, and for lawyers and judges, it is a familiar burden
to bear some measure of responsibility for those under our supervision.
In the digital age, with the potential for posts to go viral and destroy
reputations with blinding speed, this ethical duty for lawyers and judges has
assumed new meaning and importance. Not only are we our digital
brother’s keeper, but we are also increasingly judged by the digital company
we keep. For the religious conservative politician who inadvertently likes a
tweet by a porn site or for the NFL team owner who mistakenly likes a tweet
critical of his starting quarterback, such online faux pas can usually be
laughed off as embarrassing one-offs. Judges, however, need to remain
vigilant about their contacts in cyberspace and not be lulled into a false sense
of security or anonymity.
As social media use has become more pervasive among the judiciary,
jurists cannot afford the casual regard exhibited by most social media users.
Every like, every share, and every follow can have meaning and serve as a
reflection on that judge. This Article does not call for judges to retreat from
the use of social media; instead, it urges a more responsible and vigilant
embrace of these platforms. To maintain public confidence in the fairness
of the justice system, we must continue to be concerned about not just
avoiding actual bias, but about avoiding even the appearance of bias or
partiality.

